Decentralization and local public services in Ghana: Do geography and ethnic diversity matter? by Akramov, Kamiljon T. & Asante, Felix Ankomah
 
 
IFPRI Discussion Paper 00872 
June 2009 
 
Decentralization and Local Public Services in Ghana: Do 
Geography and Ethnic Diversity Matter? 
Kamiljon T. Akramov  
Felix Asante 
Development Strategy and Governance Division INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) was established in 1975. IFPRI is one of 15 
agricultural research centers that receive principal funding from governments, private foundations, and 
international and regional organizations, most of which are members of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). 
FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTORS AND PARTNERS 
IFPRI’s research, capacity strengthening, and communications work is made possible by its financial 
contributors and partners. IFPRI gratefully acknowledges generous unrestricted funding from Australia, 
Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 




Kamiljon T. Akramov, International Food Policy Research Institute 
Postdoctoral Fellow, Development Strategy and Governance Division 
Email: k.akramov@cgiar.org 
 
Felix Asante, University of Ghana 
Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research 
University of Ghana, Legon, Ghana 
 
Notices 
1 Effective January 2007, the Discussion Paper series within each division and the Director General’s Office of IFPRI 
were merged into one IFPRI–wide Discussion Paper series. The new series begins with number 00689, reflecting the 
prior publication of 688 discussion papers within the dispersed series. The earlier series are available on IFPRI’s 
website at www.ifpri.org/pubs/otherpubs.htm#dp. 
2 IFPRI Discussion Papers contain preliminary material and research results. They have not been subject to formal 
external reviews managed by IFPRI’s Publications Review Committee but have been reviewed by at least one 
internal and/or external reviewer. They are circulated in order to stimulate discussion and critical comment.
 
Copyright 2008 International Food Policy Research Institute. All rights reserved. Sections of this material may be reproduced for 
personal and not-for-profit use without the express written permission of but with acknowledgment to IFPRI. To reproduce the 
material contained herein for profit or commercial use requires express written permission. To obtain permission, contact the 




Acknowledgments  v 
Abstract  vi 
1.  Introduction  7 
2.  Overview of Decentralization in Ghana  9 
3. Theory  11 
4.  Empirical Methodology and Data  16 
5. Regression Results  24 
6. Conclusions  32 
References  33 
Appendix  36 
Recent IFPRI Discussion Papers  39  
iv 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1. Moran’s I test for spatial dependence  23 
Table 2. Determinants of access to local services (district-level data)  25 
Table 3. Determinants of access to drinking water (household level)  27 
Table 4. Determinants of access to improved drinking water (household level)  28 
Table 5. Determinants of access to drinking water (household level, interactions)  30 
 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Distribution of access to local public services in Ghana: Composite index of access to 
services     19
Figure 2. Partial associations between the dependent variable (access to local public services) 
and the key independent variables (geography and ethnic diversity)     21
Figure 3. Partial associations between geography, ethnic diversity, and proximate determinants 
of access to local public services     22
Figure 4. Spatial patterns of access to local public services, poverty, literacy, and access to 





Regina Birner, Nethra Palaniswamy, Andrew Dillon, Tewodaj Mogues, Samuel Benin, John Ulimwengu, 
several seminar participants at IFPRI, and conference participants at Oxford University’s Center for Study 
of African Economies, and two anonymous referees provided valuable comments. We want to thank them 






This paper explores disparities in local public service provision between decentralized districts in Ghana 
using district- and household-level data. The empirical results show that districts’ geographic locations 
play a major role in shaping disparities in access to local public services in Ghana. Most importantly, the 
findings suggest that ethnic diversity has significant negative impact in determining access to local public 
services, including drinking water. This negative impact is significantly higher in rural areas. However, 
the negative impact of ethnic diversity in access to local public services (drinking water) decreases as 
average literacy level increases. The paper relates the results to literature and discusses policy 
implications of main findings.   
 








1.  INTRODUCTION 
The decentralization of authority and responsibility for public services provision to local governments is 
an essential part of the overall governance reform and development strategy in many developing countries 
around the world. The argument is that decentralization will increase economic efficiency and allow 
greater differentiation in the provision of public services due to improved preference matching and 
government accountability (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Lockwood 2006). This reflects the beliefs 
that because local governments are closer to the people than the central government, (1) they will be 
better informed about the preferences and circumstances of the residents; therefore, decentralization can 
improve allocative efficiency in the sense that the services provided by local governments will be better 
matched to the preferences of their populace; and (2) local people might be better informed about the 
actions of local government; therefore, they will be in a better position to hold their government more 
accountable. 
However, some authors argue that the benefits of decentralization are not as obvious as 
proponents of decentralization suggest, and there could be serious shortcomings that policymakers should 
be aware of in designing decentralization policies (Prud’homme 1995; Breton 2002; Crook 2003; Collier 
2007). One of the potential risks with decentralization is that it can lead to greater interjurisdictional 
disparities due to the differences in socioeconomic potential and expenditure needs of subnational 
governments. The argument is that subnational governments with better factor endowments and potential 
will have a larger revenue base than other, poorer subnational governments and therefore will be able to 
provide more local public services. This may cause disparities in economic opportunities and create gaps 
in income and public service delivery between various jurisdictions. Prud’homme (1995) considers 
decentralization as the pure decentralization as viewed in earlier fiscal federalism literature; that is, local 
governments fund local public services with their own local revenues without transfers from the central 
government. However, evidence suggests that intergovernmental transfers, such as equalization grants, 
can play an important role in overcoming imbalances between revenue capacities and expenditure needs 
of local governments (Martinez-Vazquez and Searle 2007). 
Another risk with decentralization may include inadequate local capacity and the politics of local-
central relations. Government accountability and allocative efficiency may not be achieved with 
decentralization when the scarcity of public sector administrative, financial, and managerial capacity is 
more problematic at the lower levels of government (Collier 2008; Crook 2003). However, the evidence 
suggests that lack of resources is not necessarily the problem. Using examples from Uganda and South 
Africa, Dauda (2006) shows that developing political capacity for demanding accountability for existing 
resources is more important.     
Whether advantages or disadvantages of decentralization will prevail is an empirical question. 
There are several studies that examine the relationship between decentralization and regional disparity 
both in developed and developing countries (e.g., Ahmad, Brosio, and Tanzi 2008; Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2005; Gajwani, Kanbur, and Zhang 2006; Kanbur and Zhang 2005; Kim, Hong, and Ha 
2003). These studies mostly focus on developed or developing countries of Asia and Latin America, and 
evidence appears to be inconclusive. This problem in the context of sub-Saharan African countries is 
studied very rarely despite the fact that for many countries in the region such as Ghana, it is a very 
practical issue as they are pursuing serious decentralization programs. Vanderpuye-Orgle (2002) finds 
that regional disparities between the northern and the southern regions of Ghana have taken an upward 
trend since 1992. This time period coincides with the inception of an important decentralization policy. 
However, Vanderpuye-Orgle does not provide any analysis of the disparities between districts.       
The aim of this study is to contribute new empirical insights to this question, derived from district- and 
household-level quantitative analysis. For a district-level analysis, we create unique cross-sectional data 
for 110 districts of Ghana. Our household-level analysis is based on the Core Welfare Indicators 
Questionnaire survey conducted in 2003. We focus on the following specific research questions: What is 
the extent of interdistrict disparities in Ghana? What are the determinants of observed disparities between  
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decentralized districts? What is the impact of spatial disparities on access to local public services at the 
household level?  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of 
Ghana’s decentralization policy. Section 3 reviews the literature and then develops a simple theoretical 
framework to examine the potential sources of disparities between decentralized districts. Section 4 
describes data sources and discusses empirical methodology. Section 5 reports the empirical results of the 







2.  OVERVIEW OF DECENTRALIZATION IN GHANA 
Ghana’s current legal and organizational framework for the decentralization program is provided by the 
1993 Local Government Act (Act 462), which replaced the Local Government Law of 1988 (Law 207). 
The initiative for the program was motivated by a political philosophy of “power to the people” and the 
broader reform agenda whose principles concern the role and responsibilities of the various levels of 
government and private sector for economic development (Ayee 2003a, 2003b). The decentralization 
process in Ghana started with the establishment of 85 districts in 10 regions of the country in 1988. By 
1992, the number of districts had increased to 110.
1
With respect to fiscal decentralization, districts are entitled to generate their own internal 
revenues. However, the potential to generate their own internal revenue varies significantly across 
districts: Some districts cover up to 70 percent of their total public expenditures by internally generated 
revenues, yet some other, poor districts cover only about 5 percent of their total public expenditures by 
internally collected funds. The latter districts rely mostly on transfers from the national government. 
   
The 1992 Constitution, which marked Ghana’s transition to a multiparty democracy, endorsed the 
1988 reforms by consolidating the principles of decentralization within the overall context of a liberal 
democratic constitution. This constitution laid out the principles of the autonomous role of local 
government and its downward accountability to the populace. A three-tier structure of subnational 
government was created at the regional, district, and subdistrict levels. This includes 10 regional 
coordinating councils; district assemblies (DAs); urban, zonal, town, and area councils; and unit 
committees. However, the DA is the key local government institution. Article 241 of the constitution 
states that they are “the highest political authority in the district … with deliberative, legislative and 
executive power.” DAs include both elected and appointed members. Seventy percent of DA members are 
elected in local government elections that are held every four years. The central government appoints the 
other 30 percent of DA members and the district chief executive (DCE), who is an ex-officio member of 
the respective DA. The members of the national parliament from a district are also entitled to participate 
in the DA with nonvoting capacity.  
In general, the DAs hold three to four general meetings each year, during which they act as the 
district legislature. The main administrative and executive functions of the DAs are undertaken by the 
respective executive committees, which are responsible for general policy and overall development 
planning in a given district. They are the principal authority in their respective districts for development 
activities, including coordinating and integrating other development partners. The districts are responsible 
for delivery of various public goods and services, including such significant areas as feeder roads, 
agricultural extension, primary and secondary education, health, water, and sanitation. Part of these public 
service delivery functions are devolved to district governments, while others are simply deconcentrated to 
them.  
Devolved public services entail full responsibility residing in the hands of district governments, 
including legislative (adopting bylaws), fiscal (revenue raising and expenditure allocation), and 
administrative discretionary power. Examples of such devolved services in Ghana include construction 
and maintenance of feeder roads, delivery of relief and sanitation services, and development planning. 
Delegated public services include those that are delegated to districts by the central government ministry 
or agency. In this case, the DAs act as agents of central government without significant discretionary 
power in these services. Examples of delegated services in Ghana are the provision of public health 
services in consultation with the Ministry of Health; the delivery of primary and secondary education 
under guidance of the Ministry of Education; and water supply in conjunction with the Ghana Water and 
Sewerage Corporation in urban areas and with the Community Water and Sanitation Agency in rural 
areas. 
                                                       
1 As a result of further changes in administrative structure of the country, the number of districts increased to 138 in 2004, 
and to 162 in 2007. However, this study is based on 110 districts due to lack of data for newly created districts.   
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Article 252 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana mandated the transfer of at least 5 percent of total national 
fiscal revenues to district governments through the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF), which was 
implemented in 1994. Starting in 2008, the size of these transfers increased to 7.5 percent of the total 
national revenues. On average, in 2004, transfers from the central government accounted for over 80 
percent of total local revenues. The DACF grants are allocated between districts based on a special 
formula, which is approved by the national parliament every year. This formula considers various social 
and economic factors, such as need, responsiveness, service pressure, and equality, in allocation of DACF 
funds between districts (for a detailed discussion of the DACF and the allocation formula, see Banful 
2008).  
Earlier studies have shown that the development pattern in Ghana is characterized by a north-
south divide in which the south outperforms the north (ODI and CEPA 2005; Shepherd and Gyimah-
Boadi 2004). These studies claimed that underdevelopment of the north compared with the south is due to 
history, unfavorable climate and agro-ecological conditions, and postindependence political neglect. One 
previous study in particular found that overall inequality in Ghana has taken an upward trend since 1992 
and become increasingly polarized (Vanderpuye-Orgle 2002). This study argued that much of the 
variation in total inequality can be attributed to changes in spatial disparities between administrative 
regions, agro-ecological zones, and the rural-urban divide. However, there are serious gaps in the existing 
research. As we mentioned earlier, the main administrative unit for decentralization in Ghana is a district. 
Therefore, any meaningful decentralization policy needs information about levels and trends in 






In this section, we briefly review the literature and develop a simple theoretical framework that helps to 
organize our thoughts and focus on potential sources of cross-district differences in local public service 
provision. The model will also help us in developing specifications for the empirical analysis.  
3.1. The Literature 
The case for decentralization is fundamentally based on accountability and efficiency considerations. 
Decentralization may help to improve accountability in two ways: via yardstick competition and by 
strengthening the link between policy choices and reelection chances of local politicians (Hindricks and 
Lockwood 2006). With respect to efficiency considerations, Oates (1972) suggested that centralization 
should be naturally superior to decentralization so long as returns are increasing to scale. Thus, any case 
for decentralization on efficiency grounds should evoke counterbalancing sources of efficiency in which 
decentralized governments have an advantage.  
As Lockwood (2006) summarizes, there are two broad approaches to the problem: the “standard” 
model and the political economy approach. The standard model assumes that both central and local 
governments are benevolent, that is, they maximize total welfare in their respective jurisdictions. This 
approach developed the so-called decentralization theorem, which results in the following general 
statements: (1) If jurisdictions are identical and there are no spillovers between them, then centralized and 
decentralized provisions of public services are equally efficient; (2) if jurisdictions are not identical and 
there are no spillovers between them, then decentralized provision is more efficient; (3) if jurisdictions are 
identical and there are spillovers between them, then centralized provision is more efficient (Oats 1972; 
Lockwood 2006). However, these results rest largely on two key assumptions: benevolence at each level 
of government, and policy uniformity, that is, “uniformity in public programs across all communities.”
2
For example, Besley and Coate (2003) provide a political economy (legislative) model to 
examine centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods. In this model, they assume that 
elected representatives in national legislature bargain over public goods provision in multiple districts. 
Similar to the standard model, if districts are not identical, they find that decentralized provision of local 
public services continues to be welfare superior in the absence of spillovers. However, contrary to the 
standard approach, they find that centralization is no longer superior when spillovers are present. 
Moreover, they find that higher heterogeneity reduces the relative efficiency of centralization for any 
level of spillovers because heterogeneity creates conflicts of interest between citizens of different 
districts. Thus, in the presence of heterogeneity between districts, strategic choice of delegates by voters 
may cause centralization to be less efficient by reducing “preference matching.” Faguet (2004) uses a 
similar framework to examine whether decentralization increases the responsiveness of public investment 
 
These assumptions are problematic, especially for developing countries. Another disadvantage of the 
standard approach is that it does not consider the accountability argument at all.   
The political economy approach, which systematically models the behavior of government, 
taking into account political and institutional context, relaxes both of these assumptions simultaneously 
by assuming that under centralization, local public good provision may be heterogeneous, and moreover, 
levels of public good provision are determined by bargaining between district delegates to a national 
legislature. Thus, in the standard approach, political processes and institutions, not benevolent social 
planners, determine the choice of public policies in practice. There are various threads within the political 
economy approach to decentralization, such as legislative, strategic delegation and electoral 
accountability models (Lockwood 2006). Our aim here is not to extensively review all those models but 
rather to highlight that the political economy approach can give a rigorous account of the efficiency 
(preference matching) and accountability benefits of decentralization. 
                                                       
2 Oates, W., 1972. Fiscal Federalism. Harcourt-Brace, New York.   
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to local needs in Bolivia. Ahmad and Brosio (2005) also use an analogous framework to evaluate 
outcomes of decentralization in Ghana and find mixed results. 
There is a considerable amount of literature on democratic decentralization, participation, and 
service delivery. Although decentralization has potential to increase accountability and to improve service 
delivery at the local level, the evidence suggests that (1) quality and equity of access to services have not 
improved with decentralization, and (2) outcome of decentralization is closely related to the availability 
of financial resources and local government capacity (Robinson 2007). Crook (2003) finds that in most 
sub-Saharan African countries, elite capture of local governments has been facilitated by the desire of 
ruling elites to create and sustain a power base in the countryside. He concludes that even when the 
interests of the poor have achieved some representation through democratic decentralization, 
accountability mechanisms have not been strong enough to ensure that these interests are represented 
effectively in policymaking. However, using examples from Uganda and South Africa, Dauda (2006) 
shows that developing political capacity for demanding accountability for existing resources is 
imperative. The evidence demonstrates that participation in civil society institutions and diversity within 
government structures are vital in developing ways of demanding accountability and transparency of local 
government.      
Another group of studies analyzes the relationship between decentralization (and fiscal 
federalism), regional disparities, and economic development. Theoretically, the relationship between 
decentralization and spatial disparity is ambiguous. McKinnon (1997) and Qian and Weingast (1997) 
focus on the incentive effects of decentralization on subnational governments and suggest that regional 
disparities may be related to the efficiency of public services. Fiscal centralization and redistribution of 
resources from central government to ex post poor districts may soften their budget constraints and distort 
their ex ante incentives to escape from getting poor. In this regard, decentralization might help to reduce 
regional disparities.  
However, decentralization might lead to horizontal fiscal imbalances between decentralized 
districts because of the different fiscal capacities and expenditure needs of these districts. It might also 
lead to vertical imbalances in favor of the central government because of the same reason. In many 
countries an intergovernmental transfer system exists to overcome these imbalances (Martinez-Vazquez 
and Searle 2007).
3
3.2. The Model 
   Some authors question the effectiveness of such equalization transfers. On the one 
hand, equalization transfers could give disadvantaged districts the scope they need for investments in 
public infrastructure and services. On the other hand, it is not clear whether they use these transfers 
effectively (Feld and Dede 2005). It is also possible that instead of investing in public services, these 
transfers are used for consumption and rent-seeking activities. 
There are a number of empirical studies on the impact of decentralization on spatial disparity 
(Kim at al. 2003; Bonet 2006; Kanbur and Zhang 2005; Zhang and Zou 1998). For example, Kanbur and 
Zhang (2005) show that decentralization led to higher regional inequalities in Chinese provinces in the 
period from 1952 to 1999. Similarly, Zhang and Zou (1998) find that a higher degree of fiscal 
decentralization in Chinese government spending is associated with lower provincial economic growth 
from 1978 to 1992. Contrary to these findings, Bonet (2006) finds a negative impact of fiscal 
decentralization on regional income distribution in Colombia. Ahmad et al. (2008), reviewing theoretical 
and empirical literature, suggest that links between decentralization and convergence and the like are 
tenuous. 
Our empirical analysis is based on a simple analytical framework for decentralized provision of local 
public services, which is developed using insights from Besley and Coate (2003), Faguet (2004), and 
                                                       
3 Examples of developing and transition countries that use intergovernmental equalization transfers are  Nigeria, Ghana, 
Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, and India among others. Many developed nations, such as Canada, Germany, Japan, Australia, and the 
United Kingdom also use fiscal equalization schemes.     
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Ahmad and Brosio (2005). However, differently from these studies, our focus is not centralized versus 
decentralized provision of public goods, but the differences in local public service provision between 
decentralized districts. A country is made up of K decentralized districts, with a population size of Nk each 
where subscript k identifies district. We assume that districts are not identical and they provide certain 
local public services to their constituents. Preferences of all individuals have the same linear form, 
,    (1) 
where   is a private good consumed by an individual i, and gk is the amount of local public service 
available in district k. The preference of individual i for local public service gk is denoted by µi.  
In most developing countries, local public goods are financed by both a proportional local tax on 
income and transfers from a central government and donors. However, for the sake of simplicity, we 
assume that districts rely only on a local tax (a head tax), tk, to finance local public services. Therefore, 
utility of an individual i in district k is 
,    (2) 
where   and  indicates the income of individual i in district k. We can define local 
welfare as a median utility, 
,    (3) 
where m is used to denote the median individual in district k, and   and   are the local median 
income and preference for local public service in district k, respectively. 
The budget constraint for district k can be defined as 
  ,    (4) 
where  indicates the potential cost disability
4
By solving equation (4) for tax rate, we get the required tax rate to provide  level of local public service 
in district k: 
 of a given district k. This cost disability factor should not 
be confused with economies of scale, that is, cost advantage due to size, which is represented by the 
district population ( ). This cost disability factor captures the differences in the cost of local service 
delivery across districts relative to the average of all districts. A district may have a cost disadvantage for 
provision of local public service for a variety of reasons. For example, it may have a geographically 
dispersed population and have to provide services in remote locations. This means that, ceteris paribus, a 
unit cost of a particular service in this district may have a higher cost than the average cost across all 
districts. Other factors contributing to differences in cost of service provision might include the 
composition (rural versus urban, sex, age, etc.) of the population. Furthermore, the differences in the cost 
of service provision could be related to differences between districts in government accountability, 
bureaucratic slack, managerial capabilities, and technical knowledge of local governments.  
    (5) 
By substituting the tax rate from equation (5) into equation (3), we rewrite the utility of median 
individual in district k as 
,    (6) 
where we drop all subscripts m for simplicity. Thus, the local government’s welfare maximization 
problem in district k is  
.    (7) 
                                                       
4 Assuming there are only two districts, this cost disability factor can be defined as  , and   is 
the cost local service provision in district k. So defined, if  , then district k is a relatively high-cost provider of the local 
public service (has a cost disability), and if  , it is a relatively low-cost provider.   
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Taking first-order conditions and rearranging yields, we get the optimum choice of local public 
service as  
    (8) 
 
Thus, the equilibrium level of local public services provided by district k is an implicit function 
of the income ( ) and the cost disability factor ( , the median preference ( ) for the local public 
good, and the size ( ) of the district. This also implies that local governments are more likely to provide 
different levels of public services to their constituents, as these factors tend to vary across districts. From 
equation (8), it is easy to see that, ceteris paribus, local public goods provision will be higher in districts 
with better cost efficiency and homogenous preferences.  
So far we have focused on potential sources of disparities between districts in local public service 
provision. The important question is, How do these factors impact access to local public services at the 
household level? Similarly to Ahmad and Brosio (2005), extending the insights of the analysis above to 
the individual level, we can determine the consumer surplus for a given individual   from a given district 
 as follows: 
.    (9) 
Equation (9) suggests that, other things being equal, the well-being of individuals will be higher 
in districts where the local government can determine the preferences for local public goods more 
precisely, the cost-efficiency of district government, and the district size. 
3.3. Discussion 
Some important aspects of local public service provision are not explicitly addressed in this simple 
model. We now consider two important implications of the model. This will help us to derive the 
specifications of the empirical model and to bring the theory with the data. First, the model suggests that 
economies of scale may exist in the provision of local public services, because average costs decline as 
the number of recipients of the services increases. Equation (4) implies that there is a negative correlation 
between population size N and local tax rate t. In other words, for given g and γ, as district size N 
increases, the per-head tax level t decreases. Thus, more populous districts are more likely to have an 
advantage in local service provision. However, the relationship between the level of local public services 
and population size might be endogenous, that is, better local services may attract migration and thus 
increase population size. For this reason, it is best to think of population size as a proximate determinant 
of local public service provision. We consider geography as a deeper factor, which affects both local 
services and population density. Geography relates to the advantages and disadvantages created by 
districts’ physical locations and agro-ecological conditions. In fact, the descriptive analysis in Section 4.2 
shows considerable correlation between districts’ geographic location and population density (correlation 
coefficient = 0.53). However, this does not mean that geography can fully replace population density in 
the empirical analysis. We may still need to include population density in the empirical model. 
Geography might also directly influence the demand for and supply of local public services. 
Different types of countryside might have an advantage for different types of local public goods. For 
example, supply of drinking water is highly dependent on the availability of surface and ground water 
sources in a given geographic area. Climate and environment play important roles in shaping the public 
health environment (the inhabitants’ proclivity to debilitating infectious diseases such as malaria) and the 
need for public health care. The evidence also suggests that areas closer to large metropolitan areas tend 
to have higher population density due to agglomeration effects (World Bank 2008). Further, geography 
may influence local public services through other factors such as institutions. As Eichengreen (1998), 
Engerman, Haber, and Sokoloff (2000), and Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) have shown, the initial factor 
endowments for the large part explain income, human capital, and political power inequalities; these  
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inequalities in turn explain the structure and functioning of institutions that insure the persistence of 
inequalities.  
Second, our theoretical model suggests that the equilibrium level of local public services will be 
lower, ceteris paribus, if the preferences for local public services are more diverse. We have not related 
the preferences for local public services to any observable variables yet. In recent years, there has been 
increasing interest in the impact of ethnic diversity on the preferences for public services. The literature 
suggests that preferences for public services and ethnic origins are strongly correlated. It is evident that 
different ethnic groups tend to have different tastes and preferences for local public services, and thus, 
heterogeneity of preferences across ethnic groups in a jurisdiction is likely to influence the amount and 
type of public goods the jurisdiction provides (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Vigdor 2004). 
Obviously, ethnic diversity is not the only factor that influences preferences for local public goods. 
Certainly, income and education are other ones. Thus, distribution of income and variations in education 
level, in addition to ethnic diversity, could be important determinants of the distribution of preferences for 
public goods. Therefore, in the empirical work we control for income distribution and education. 
Further, literature also suggests that participation in social activities tends to be significantly 
lower in more fragmented localities, leading to lower social capital and weak local institutions. As a 
result, the incapability of weak local institutions to impose social sanctions in diverse communities leads 
to collective action failures. Diverse communities thus face higher coordination costs in provision of local 
public services (Miguel and Gugerty 2005). Hence, ethnic fragmentation may also influence local public 
services through its impact on the cost efficiency factor. 
Finally, geography may also influence ethnic diversity in the long run via migration. In the 
simplest form migrants from unfavorable regions may be drawn to regions with favorable conditions, and 
this in-migration may increase ethnic diversity in receiving regions. Given the insights of the model and 
follow-up discussion, the important empirical question is, What impact do geography and ethnic diversity 
have on local public services? The next section describes data and explains how we plan to empirically 




4.  EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
4.1. Empirical Model Specifications  
Our theoretical model suggests that the level of public services provided by a decentralized district 
depends on the income, the cost efficiency, median preferences over local public services, and population 
size in the district. The follow-up discussion links these factors with geography and ethnic fragmentation, 
the two potentially exogenous determinants of cross-district disparity in local public service delivery. 
Thus, the main question for our empirical analysis is whether geography and ethnic diversity have any 
effect on local public services after controlling for observable variables at the district and household 
levels. While exogeneity of geography is quite obvious, we have ruled out that local unobservable 
characteristics correlated with ethnic fragmentation—rather than ethnic fragmentation itself—are in fact 
driving the estimated effects. Our identification strategy with respect to ethnic fragmentation is similar to 
Miguel and Gugerty (2004) and relies on the stable, historically determined patterns of ethnic land 
settlements in Ghana and their persistence over time. Ghana is a highly multiethnic and multicultural 
country with about 100 ethnic groups characterized by linguistic and cultural differences. Nevertheless, 
Ghana’s population now can be classified into five groups
5
,  (10) 
: the Guan, the Mole-Dagbani, the Akan, the 
Ewe, and the Ga-Adangbe. These groups settled in the country over the last 1,000 years, and their land 
settlements largely have been stable over time (Salm and Falola 2002). Thus, it is plausible to assume that 
ethnic land settlement patterns in Ghana are exogenous. 
We have divided the analysis into three stages. The first stage analyzes the evidence of cross-
district differences in access to local public services and to what extent these differences had been shaped 
by local geographic endowments and ethnic diversity. This analysis is based on standard ordinary least 
squares (OLS) methodology. To test the robustness of the OLS results to spatial dependence, we also 
estimate our models by using spatial econometric techniques.  
At the district level, to examine the impact of geography and ethnic diversity in access to local 
public services, we estimate the model 
where  is a matrix of geographic location variables including distance to district from the nation’s 
capital (Accra) and distance to district from a respective regional capital and agro-ecological zone;   
is a vector of district-level ethnic fractionalization; and   is a matrix of district characteristics including 
population density, share of rural population, average literacy level, per capita public expenditures, and 
internal revenue generation. We use a composite index
6
  
 of access to local public services as a dependent 
variable ( ). We include each group of independent variables incrementally, and lastly we estimate the 
full model.  
Additionally, we use spatial econometric techniques to explore the importance of the effects of 
neighboring districts for robustness of the results. The motivation for this is that unobserved effects may 
spillover across districts and hence result in spatially correlated errors. As a result, standard OLS 
estimates are no longer efficient, but they are still unbiased. The most common choice to model such 
spatial dependence is a spatial autoregressive process such as 
                  ,   (11) 
with γ  as the autoregressive parameter,   as a spatially correlated error, and   as a well-behaved random 
error term (Anselin 2006). 
In the second stage, to formally answer whether geography and ethnic diversity have impact in 
determining household-level access to local public services, we estimate series of multilevel random-
intercept logistic models for access to drinking water. For this analysis our dependent variable is binary or 
                                                       
5 Some mention six broad groups or classifications for Ghanaians: the five noted here plus the Gurma; others note only four, 
omitting the Guan.  
6 The details of this composite measure of access to local public services are given in next section.  
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dichotomous, which measures whether a household has access to drinking water. The responses are coded 
as 1 or 0, where 1 is interpreted as the household’s having access to drinking water and 0 as not having 
access. We use two types of information as indicators of access to drinking water: (1) access to any 
source of drinking water (from now on, drinking water) and (2) access to an improved source of drinking 
water (from now on, improved drinking water). A natural model to consider for estimating the effects of 
district and household characteristics on access to drinking water is a standard logistic regression model. 
Standard logistic regression modeling usually assumes that the error terms have zero mean and are 
mutually independent. However, in nested cross-sectional data, we would expect that measurements 
within the same districts are correlated. In this case, standard logistic regression estimates are still 
consistent, but the estimated standard errors of the regression coefficients are no longer valid. 
One way of addressing this problem is to use multilevel modeling, which explicitly models the 
dependence by decomposing the total residual or error term into error components: a permanent error 
component, which varies between districts; and a transitory error component, which varies between 
households as well as districts. The permanent error component represents the combined effects of 
omitted district characteristics or unobserved heterogeneity. Since it is shared by all households for the 
same district, it induces within-district dependence. Another advantage of using multilevel modeling is 
that multilevel models allow us to test whether within-level or cross-level interactions are significant in 
determining the dependent variable. 
We specify a two-level random-intercept logit model for access to drinking water with household   nested 
in district  :  
,  (12) 
where   is a vector containing all household-level covariates,   is a vector containing all district-
level covariates,   is a random intercept varying over districts (level 2), and   is a well-behaved error 
term that has a logistic distribution with variance γ
2/3.   is a binary variable for a household that has 
access to drinking water. This two-level random-intercept model can be viewed as a regression model 
with a district-specific intercept  . Here  can be considered as a random parameter that is not 
estimated along with parameters  , but whose variance is estimated together with the 
variance of the  . 
Similar to equation (12), we specify a three-level random-intercept logit model for access to a 
drinking water with household   nested in district   which is nested in region  : 
,  (13) 
where   is a vector containing all household-level covariates,   is a vector containing all district-
level covariates,   is a random intercept varying over districts (level 2),   is a random intercept varying 
across regions, and   is a well-behaved error term that has a logistic distribution with variance γ
2/3.   
is a binary variable for a household that has access to drinking water. Obviously, the random intercepts 
(  and  ) are assumed to be independent.  
In stages 1 and 2 (equations 10 to 13), the main coefficients of interest are   and  . Following 
the argument in Section 3.2, we expect that unfavorable geography impacts local public service provision 
negatively. Similarly, we expect that ethnic diversity negatively impacts the provision of local public 
services. The variables in D and HH are not included in equations (10) to (13) as mere controls, however. 
The coefficients of variables in D are of interest insofar as they help to explain district-level institutional 
and socioeconomic determinants of local public service provision, and so constitute indirect tests of the 
predictions of our theoretical model. The coefficients of variables in HH are of interest to the extent that 
they play a role in reducing negative effects of an adverse geography and ethnic diversity. For example, 
we expect that education and income positively impact households’ access to local public services.   
In the third stage, to explore the potential interaction effects of ethnic diversity with district- and 
household-level variables, we extend equation (13) with interaction terms. First, we examine the 
interaction of ethnic diversity with each district’s average literacy level, considering the literacy level as a 
proxy for human capital and managerial capacity in the district. Our hypothesis is that the negative impact  
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of ethnic fractionalization on local public service provision will be mitigated as literacy level increases. 
Second, we investigate the specific impact of ethnic fractionalization on local public services in rural 
areas by interacting it with a rural household variable. We expect that the negative impact of ethnic 
fractionalization on local public services will be higher for rural households. 
4.2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The empirical analysis is based on the 2003 Ghana Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) 
survey (Ghana Statistical Service 2003). This standardized survey of core welfare indicators comprised a 
sample of 49,003 households nationwide, with at least 405 households randomly drawn from each of 110 
administrative districts of Ghana existing at the time of the survey. The data are representative at the 
district level. The survey was conducted by the Ghana Statistical Service with methodological and 
financial support from the World Bank. Additional district- and household-level data were collected from 
other sources, including the 2000 Ghana Population and Housing Census (Ghana Statistical Service 
2005). A more detailed description of the dependent and key independent variables is provided below. 
Table A.1 in the appendix reports summary statistics of all of the variables utilized in the empirical 
analyses. 
Dependent Variables 
We use CWIQ (Ghana Statistical Service 2003) data to measure access to local public services, which 
provides measures of access to seven public services, including drinking water, public food markets, 
public transportation, primary school, secondary school, health care, and telecommunication. The survey 
asked households, How long in minutes does it take from here to reach the nearest service facility? The 
five possible choices are as follows: 0–14 minutes, score 1; 15–29 minutes, score 2; 30–44 minutes, score 
3; 45–59 minutes, score 4; 60 minutes or more, score 5. Thus, the higher the score, the longer the time to 
reach the nearest service facility.  
Descriptive statistic analysis shows that these measures of access to different local services are 
highly correlated across all households, with correlation coefficients ranging from 0.6 to 0.9. This 
suggests that randomly selected households are likely to have similar levels of access to different local 
public services. To facilitate analysis, and in order to obtain an average rate of access to seven local 
public services covered by CWIQ (Ghana Statistical Service 2003) at the district level that is meaningful 
and useful, we construct a composite index of access to local public services by using principal 
components analysis, which captures most of the variance in access to different local public services for 
each district.
7
For household-level analysis of access to drinking water, we use two types of dependent 
variables. Our first dependent variable (water_ac) shows whether a household has a reasonable access 
(water source within 14 minutes) to any supply of drinking water. About 82 percent of all households 
reported having access to any source of drinking water. By area of residence, urban households have 
considerably higher (91.4 percent) access than rural households (77.3 percent). The alternative dependent 
variable (impr_water) shows whether a household has access to improved drinking water sources, 
including piped water in the dwelling, public outdoor tap, borehole, and protected well. Overall, about 72 
percent of all Ghanaian households have access to improved water sources. Again, by area of residence, 
urban households (almost 88 percent) have significantly higher access to improved drinking water than 
 This is our dependent variable (access) for the district-level analysis. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of access to local public services across Ghana’s decentralized 
districts. The index is constructed in a way that lower scores are associated with better access to local 
services, and vice versa. It varies between 1.2 for Tema Municipal district, where about 2.7 percent of 
Ghana’s total population live, and 3.8 for Chereponi-Saboba district, where only 0.5 percent of Ghana’s 
population reside. 
                                                       
7 This process is explained in detail in the Appendix.  
19 
 
rural households (63 percent). However, this gap is much higher compared with access to any source of 
drinking water. Data also suggest that there are significant variations in access to any and improved 
drinking water across regions and districts. 
Figure 1. Distribution of access to local public services in Ghana: Composite index of access to 
services 
 
Source: CWIQ (2003), GSS, and authors’ calculations 
 
Independent Variables 
Our independent variables include geography, ethnic diversity, and district- and household-level 
socioeconomic indicators. Ghana is located in a tropical zone, but because of variations in relief, soil 
texture, and such factors as rainfall patterns, it comprises different microclimates. These differences have 
potentially important impact on the productivity of land and economic development. The evidence shows 
that the development pattern in Ghana is characterized by a north-south divide in which the north lags far 
behind the south. The evidence also suggests that these regions are heterogeneous zones. Reasons often 
put forward include unfavorable geography and economic conditions among others, such as history and 
postindependence political neglect (Shepherd and Gyimah-Boadi 2004; ODI and CEPA 2005; Morrison 
2006). 
We use two types of variables to measure the districts’ geography: (1) distances from Accra 
(national capital) and regional capitals, and (2) agro-ecological zones. From GIS sources, we collected 
latitudes and longitudes for all districts, and then, using the great-circle distance formula,
8
                                                       
8 The great-circle distance is the shortest distance between any two points on the surface of the earth measured along a path 
on the surface of the sphere (since the earth is a sphere).  



















































distances between Accra and all Ghanaian districts (adistrict), and between regional capitals and all 
districts in the respective region (rdistrict).   
Data on agro-ecological zoning classify districts in Ghana to forest, coastal, and savanna zones.
9
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Main characteristics of these agro-ecological zones are provided in Table A.2 in the Appendix. The forest 
and coastal zones have a bimodal rainfall pattern with major and minor rainy seasons. In contrast, the 
rainfall pattern is unimodal in the savanna zone. The average annual rainfall ranges from 800 mm in the 
coastal zone to 1,600 mm in the forest zone. The forest zone specializes in industrial crops such as cocoa, 
which is the source of income and livelihood for about 25 percent of Ghana’s population. The cocoa 
industry contributes more than one-fourth of Ghana’s total export earnings. The savanna zone mainly 
specializes in cereals, such as millet, sorghum, and rice. The coastal zone is home to the nation’s capital, 
and it is more urbanized than other parts of the country.   
Following the existing literature (Alesina et al. 1999; Miguel and Gugerty 2005; etc.), we use 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization (elf) as the measure of ethnic diversity. This allows us to compare our 
results with these studies. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization is the probability that two people randomly 
drawn from the population are from different ethnic groups. It is closely related to a Herfindahl index and 
formally defined as 
where   is a proportion of group   in total population. This index was calculated using the 2000 
Ghana Population and Housing Census (Ghana Statistical Service 2005). The index of ethnic 
fragmentation varies across Ghana’s districts between 0.07 and 0.81.   
In addition, we include in the empirical models such district-level variables as population size, 
population density, share of rural population, poverty indicators, literacy level, internal revenue 
generation, and per capita public expenditures. The data to measure these variables are obtained from the 
publications of the Ghana Statistical Service. Further, from the 2003 CWIQ data we obtained such 
household characteristics as income (welfare quintiles); whether the household’s community was easily 
accessible by road all year around; whether the head of household was literate, male, or female; and 
whether the household lived in rural area.    
Correlations 
Figure 2 provides the partial associations of the access to local public services index against measures of 
geography and ethnic diversity. These partial correlations show a strong positive relationship between the 
geographic variables and the composite index of access to local public services. The index is constructed 
in a way that lower scores associate with better access to local public services and vice versa; therefore, 
the farther the district’s location from Accra and the respective regional capitals, the lower the access to 
local public services. Also, districts located in coastal and forest zones are likely to have better access to 
local public services. On the other hand, the disparities in local public service provision can also be 
attributed, at least in part, to a significant dispersion in ethnic fractionalization. The more diverse the 
district’s population, the lower the access to local public services.  
We found that geographic variables appear to have considerable correlations with other 
independent variables (Figure 3). First, the districts that are located farther from the regional capitals 
appear to have relatively higher ethnic fractionalization. Second, the districts’ geographic locations are 
strongly correlated with district characteristics such as average literacy and poverty rate
10
                                                       
10 These agro-ecological zones can further be divided into smaller zones. For example, the forest zone is divided to rain and 
deciduous forest zones.    
10 District—level poverty is obtained from Coulombe (2005). 
. Third, 
geography has significant correlations with the districts’ population density, access to information, and 
fiscal capacity. Furthermore, as expected, access to local public services is correlated with the districts’ 
proximate determinants such as population density, poverty, literacy, fiscal capacity, and share of rural 
population. For example, there is significant correlation (0.62) between access to local public services and  
21 
 
poverty rate, although we observe no significant correlation between access to local public services and 
per capita public expenditures (both total and capital). However, since correlation measures only a linear 
relationship, having correlation close or equal to zero does not mean that there is no relationship between 
these variables. 
The importance of a district’s geography suggests that there could be departures from randomness 
and spatial clustering in the data, that is, systematic pattern in spatial distribution of access to services and 
its potential determinants. Figure 4 shows the spatial patterns of access to local public services and some 
of its potential determinants. Districts showing better access to local public services tend to be clustered 
in the south (coastal and forest zones), while districts with lower access to public services tend to be 
clustered in the north (savannah zone), with some exceptions. Similarly, districts in the north are more 
likely to be poor and have low literacy levels and poor access to information. 
Figure 2. Partial associations between the dependent variable (access to local public services) and 
the key independent variables (geography and ethnic diversity) 
 




Figure 3. Partial associations between geography, ethnic diversity, and proximate determinants of 
access to local public services  
 
Source: GSS (2003 & 2005) and authors’ own estimates 
Figure 4. Spatial patterns of access to local public services, poverty, literacy, and access to 
information  
  
Source: GSS (2003 & 2005) and authors’ own estimates  
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To further examine spatial clustering in variables, we use Moran’s I test (Moran 1950), which is a 
weighted correlation coefficient used to detect departures from spatial randomness. When measures for 
nearby districts are similar, Moran’s I will be significant and positive. Table 1 reports the results of 
Moran’s I test for access to local services and its potential determinants. As can be seen in Table 1, 
several variables including access to local services, poverty rate, literacy rate, road density, and level of 
access to information show considerable positive spatial correlations. Some variables such as ethnic 
fractionalization, internal revenue generation, and share of rural population have positive but small spatial 
correlations. Other variables, including district population density and per capita public expenditures, do 
not show any statistically significant spatial patterns measured by Moran’s I. With respect to district 
public expenditures, this could be a result of the national government’s fiscal equalization policy. 
The results of descriptive analysis seem to agree with predictions of the theoretical model. 
However, these relationships are much more complicated, and we need to use multivariate econometric 
analysis, rather than simple correlations, to better understand them. The results of such analyses are 
provided in the following section. 
Table 1. Moran’s I test for spatial dependence 
  Moran’s I*  Z-value  p-value** 
Access to local services  0.44  12.265  0.000 
Poverty  0.61  16.841  0.000 
Literacy  0.67  18.348  0.000 
Road density  0.40  11.241  0.000 
Information access 
     Newspaper 










Ethnic fractionalization  0.19  5.495  0.000 
Internal revenue generation  0.13  3.858  0.000 
Share of rural population  0.13  3.863  0.000 
Population density  0.007  0.780  0.218 
Per capita public expenditures  0.025  0.927  0.177 
Source: Authors’ own estimates      
Note: * Distance band (0–1); **Probability to reject null hypothesis (absence of spatial dependence) 
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5. REGRESSION RESULTS 
5.1. District-Level Analysis  
Table 2 shows the results of district-level econometric analysis. We used a composite index of access to 
local public services, which is a combined measure of access to seven specific local services, as a 
dependent variable. Models 1–4 are OLS estimates of equation (10). Model 5 is the first-degree spatial 
error regression estimate of equation (11).  
As can be seen in Table 2, where only geographic variables are included in the model, all of them 
prove to be statistically significant. In particular, the districts that are father away from Accra as well as 
from a regional capital tend to have lower access to local public services. Similarly, the districts located in 
coastal and forest zones are likely to have better access to local public services. When we add the ethnic 
fractionalization, which is likely to encompass the heterogeneity of preferences for public services and 
social capital, geographic variables (except the coastal dummy) remain significant, but their negative 
impact diminishes considerably. This effect can be seen as demonstrating the importance of ethnic 
diversity for local public services. Further, when we add additional proximate variables (which are 
correlated with geography) into the model, the importance of geographic variables continues to diminish 
while the importance of ethnic fractionalization continues to increase.  
The full specification of the model (Model 4) explains more than three-fourths of the cross-
district variation in access to local public services in Ghana. The results suggest that ethnic 
fractionalization is the most important determinant of access to public services. Geography remains 
important. Districts that are located in coastal and forest zones are likely to have better access to local 
public services. Although distance from the regional capital is statistically significant, its practical 
importance (magnitude of estimated coefficients) is very limited. Distance from Accra is both statistically 
and practically insignificant. Among proximate determinants of access to local public services, those 
statistically significant at an acceptable level are share of rural population, literacy, internal fiscal capacity 
and access to information. All of these variables, excluding internal fiscal capacity, have expected signs.    
It is important to note that with addition of all measures of deep and proximate determinants of 
access, local public service at hand, the spatial dependence (autocorrelation) of residuals reduced 
significantly. Nevertheless, Model 5 in Table 2 displays the results implemented by considering possible 
spatial dependence between observations. The coefficients of the spatial error term appear sizable in 
magnitude and statistically significant. According to this model, ethnic fractionalization is even more 
important in determining the access to local public services. The coefficient associated with this variable 
increased to 0.79 from 0.54. The coefficients associated with the coastal dummy and internal fiscal 
capacity are no longer statistically significant at acceptable significance levels. In contrast, the coefficient 
associated with per capita district public expenditures turns out to be statistically significant. The positive 
sign of the coefficient suggests that the higher the per capita district public expenditures, the lower the 
access to local public services. How can we explain this result? One possible explanation could be the 
central government’s equalization policy. Further, we would like to emphasize the results associated with 
literacy rate. As mentioned above, we are not trying to isolate the effect of literacy skills on access to 
local public services but rather to test the use of literacy as a proxy for human capital and managerial 
capacity in the district. The estimated coefficients suggest that the higher the literacy level, the higher the 
access to local public services. Finally, the coefficient for population density (Model 5 in Table 2) 
indicates that the district size matters for local public service delivery. This suggests that there are 
economies of scale, that is, the cost advantages due to population size, in local public service provision 
across Ghana’s districts, which is in line with the predictions of the theoretical model.    
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Table 2. Determinants of access to local services (district-level data) 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Distance from Accra  0.0015*  0.0014*  0.0010*  0.0005  0.0003 
  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0004) 
Distance from region's capital  0.0041*  0.0024*  0.0022*  0.0018**  0.0016** 
  (0.0003)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0008) 
Forest  -0.3919*  -0.2718*  -0.2454*  -0.2291*  -0.2638* 
  (0.1034)  (0.0876)  (0.0861)  (0.0837)  (0.0844) 
Coastal  -0.4701*  -0.1485  -0.1641  -0.2318**  -0.2086 
  (0.1146)  (0.1057)  (0.1074)  (0.0976)  (0.1377) 
Ethnic fractionalization     0.5840*  0.5984*  0.5436*  0.7926* 
     (0.1730)  (0.1657)  (0.1683)  (0.1980) 
Share of rural population     0.0112*  0.0106*  0.0113*  0.0132* 
    (0.0016)  (0.0022)  (0.0024)  (0.0021) 
Literacy      -0.0064***  -0.0095**  -0.0115** 
      (0.0038)  (0.0038)  (0.0048) 
Population density (log)        0.0268  0.0220  0.0969*** 
        (0.0598)  (0.0617)  (0.0510) 
Per captia district expenditures (log)           0.1561***  0.1364* 
        (0.0832)  (0.0508) 
Internal revenue generation           0.0098**  0.0074 
        (0.0048)  (0.0046) 
Access to information (radio)        -0.0065**  -0.0066** 
        (0.0030)  (0.0027) 
Lambda          -0.2882* 
          (0.0678) 
Constant  1.8588  0.8468  1.1566  0.1959  0.1443 
  (0.1341)  (0.1694)  (0.4540)  (0.8846)  (0.2594) 
Adj. R-squared  0.621  0.7301  0.7358  0.7661  0.7550 
F-statistics  45.45  44.75  34.81  31.32  - 
N  110  110  110  110  110 
Note: Models 1–4 are the OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. Model 5 is the estimates of the spatial error 
regression model by maximum likelihood: log-likelihood=-14.2; variance ratio=0.762; Wald test of lambda=0: Chi
2(1)=18.083 (P 
value=0.000); LR test of lambda=0: Chi
2(1)=18.786 (P value=0.000).    
*p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; ***p<0.1. 
5.2. Household-Level Analysis 
To further examine the effects of geography, ethnic fractionalization, population density, and other 
district- and household-level characteristics on access to local public services, we use household-level 
data from the 2003 CWIQ survey. At this stage of analysis, we estimate series of multilevel random-
intercept logit models of access to drinking water based on equations (12) and (13). Our two binary 
dependent variables measure whether a household has access to a drinking water: (1) access to drinking 
water and (2) access to improved drinking water. Maximum likelihood estimates of a two- and three-level 
random-intercept logit models were obtained using generalized linear latent and mixed models 
(GLLAMM) framework, which uses adaptive quadrature (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2004 and 2005). 
The goodness of fit of the estimated models is measured by using likelihood ratio test, deviance, and  
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information criteria (AIC and BIC), which indicate that three-level random-intercept models are superior 
in describing the evidence of access to drinking water in Ghana.     
Table 3 reports coefficients estimated for determinants of access to any source of drinking water. 
Model 1 in Table 3 reports results for a model that includes only household and community 
characteristics. These results suggest that households whose head is literate are more likely to have access 
to drinking water. In the same way, households that reside in communities with all-season access to roads 
are likely to have better access to drinking water. In contrast, rural and poorer households are likely to 
have significantly lower access to drinking water. Surprisingly, ceteris paribus, households with a male 
head are less likely to have access to drinking water. On the other hand, analogous to district-level 
analysis, when only geographic variables are included in the model (not reported here), the negative 
impact of distance from Accra and regional capitals proves to be statistically significant in explaining 
household-level access to drinking water. Similarly, ethnic fractionalization has significant negative 
impact on access to drinking water.  
It is interesting to see whether household, community and district characteristics counterbalance 
the adverse effects of geography and ethnic diversity. Model 2 in Table 3 reports the results of logistic 
regression, which includes household, community, and district characteristics. The next two columns in 
Table 3 provide the results of two- and three-level random-intercept models, respectively. The 
coefficients across models tell qualitatively similar stories, with some minor exceptions, about the impact 
of explanatory variables on the probability of household-level access to drinking water. As we mentioned 
above, the three-level random-intercept model (Model 4) better fits the data. Thus, the following 
discussion is based on results of this model. The results show that the negative impact of distance from 
Accra and regional capitals virtually disappears. In fact, coefficients for these variables are practically 
very small. However, the impact of agro-ecology persists or even gets stronger, suggesting that 
households that reside in forest and coastal zones are significantly more likely to have better access to 
drinking water as compared with households from other zones. Likewise, the negative impact of ethnic 
fractionalization continues to be both statistically and practically significant. Finally, as the theoretical 
model predicts, the district size, measured by population density, influences the household-level access to 
drinking water significantly. The coefficient for population density suggests that a one-unit (percent) 
increase in district population density increases the likelihood (odds ratio) of access to drinking water at 
the household level by about 1.4 times. The results also suggest that, other things being equal, households 
that reside in districts with higher levels of human capital (literacy level) and access to information are 
more likely to have better access to drinking water. The impact of the per capita district public 
expenditures on access to any sources of water appears to be statistically insignificant. Comparing the 
results of Model 1 and Model 4, we can see that return to private (education and income) assets in terms 
of access to drinking water diminishes considerably when observable district characteristics (geography, 
ethnic diversity, population density, human capital, public expenditures, etc.) are included in the model, 
and unobserved heterogeneity at district and region levels is controlled for. However, return to public 
assets (access to roads) in terms of access to drinking water is robust to changes in model specification.  
It is more interesting to examine the results of the model for access to improved drinking water. 
These results, which are provided in Table 4, are both qualitatively and quantitatively different in many 
ways from the results in Table 3. First, positive household (education and income) and community 
characteristics (access to roads) seem to counterbalance the effects of adverse geography to greater extent. 
In fact, coefficients estimated for a three-level random-intercept logit model (our preferred specification) 
suggest that the impact of distance variables from major cities is virtually insignificant in determining 
household-level access to improved drinking water. Similarly, the impact of coastal agro-ecological zone 
is statistically insignificant. However, the results suggest that households that reside in a forest zone have 
significantly higher chances to have access to improved drinking water. At the same time, estimated 
coefficients for income quintiles, household head’s literacy, and access to all-season roads are both 
quantitatively and qualitatively robust to changes in model specification. Also, rural households seem to 
have greater disadvantage than their urban counterparts. Second, the negative impact of ethnic 
fractionalization turns out, however, to be extremely significant. In fact, the magnitude of the estimated  
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coefficient (Model 4 in Table 4) is about four times as much as compared with the model for access to 
drinking water (Model 4 in Table 3). This coefficient is equal to -1.3133 and quite precisely estimated 
with a standard error of 0.0881. Third, differently from our previous model (Table 3), the results suggest 
that per capita district public expenditures have positive impact on access to improved drinking water. 
The magnitude and sign of the estimated coefficients are robust to changes in model specification. 
Finally, the results for district characteristics such as population density and average literacy level are 
qualitatively similar for both models. However, the magnitudes of the coefficients for the model of access 
to improved drinking water are significantly higher.  
Table 3. Determinants of access to drinking water (household level) 
Dependent variable: Binary variable indicating whether a household has access to any drinking water 
source 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Household characteristics 
If head of household is male  -0.4136*  -0.2181*  -0.1962*  -0.1922* 
  (0.0309)  (0.0322)  (0.0330)  (0.0331) 
If head of household is literate  0.5389*  0.2992*  0.2943*  0.2904* 
  (0.0280)  (0.0298)  (0.0305)  (0.0305) 
Rural  -0.6911*  -0.5770*  -0.6314*  -0.6227* 
  (0.0324)  (0.0366)  (0.0377)  (0.0375) 
Income quintile 1  -0.6720*  -0.1762*  -0.1472*  -0.1469* 
  (0.0380)  (0.0418)  (0.0430)  (0.0428) 
Income quintile 2  -0.4094*  -0.1782*  -0.1262*  -0.1097* 
  (0.0389)  (0.0404)  (0.0417)  (0.0417) 
Income quintile 3  -0.2108*  -0.1104**  -0.0824**  -0.0670 
  (0.0412)  (0.0422)  (0.0433)  (0.0434) 
Income quintile 4  -0.1245*  -0.0865**  -0.0693  -0.0542 
  (0.0409)  (0.0417)  (0.0427)  (0.0428) 
Community characteristics 
Access to roads  0.4279*  0.3447*  0.3503*  0.3741* 
  (0.0259)  (0.0268)  (0.0285)  (0.0284) 
District characteristics 
Distance  to Accra     0.0008*  0.0022*  0.0021* 
     (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
Distance to regional capital     0.0022**  0.0025*  0.0023* 
     (0.0003)  (0.0004)  (0.0004) 
Forest    0.6731*  0.7904*  0.8671* 
    (0.0364)  (0.0438)  (0.0549) 
Coastal    0.5437*  0.6298*  0.7274* 
    (0.0541)  (0.0629)  (0.0666) 
Ethnic fractionalization    -0.2391*  -0.8720*  -0.3433* 
    (0.0761)  (0.0852)  (0.0989) 
Population density (log)    0.2347*  0.3281*  0.2223* 
    0.0218  (0.0295)  (0.0276) 
Share of rural population     0.0056  0.0075*  -0.0041* 
     (0.0010)  (0.0013)  (0.0016)  
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Table 3. Continued 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Literacy level    0.0079*  0.0069*  0.0084* 
    (0.0017)  (0.0019)  (0.0021) 
Per capita total expenditures (log)     -0.0269  -0.0061  0.0597 
     (0.0301)  (0.0324)  (0.0339) 
Access to information (radio)     0.0128*  0.0132*  0.0143* 
     (0.0009)  (0.0013)  (0.0011) 
Constant  2.1726  -1.0747  -2.3380  -2.1925 
  (0.0463)  (0.3577)  (0.4017)  (0.4383) 
Variances and covariances of random effects 
District      0.2194*  0.2247* 
      (0.0118)  (0.0137) 
Region        0.0868* 
        (0.0187) 
Pseudo R-squared  0.0749  0.1102  0.1464  0.1471 
Log likelihood  -20922.4  -20124.5  -19306.9  -19290.8 
Note: Models 1 and 2 are standard logistic regression models, and Models 3 and 4 are two- and three-level random-intercept 
models, respectively. The number of level-1 observations is 49,000, with 110 level-2 units (districts) and 10 level-3 units 
(regions). Logits for income quintiles are calculated with reference to quintile 5.    
*p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; ***p<0.1. 
Table 4. Determinants of access to improved drinking water (household level) 
Dependent variable: Binary variable indicating whether a household has access to improved drinking 
water 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Household characteristics 
If head of household is male  -0.3367*  -0.3311*  -0.3289*  -0.3150* 
  (0.0259)  (0.0274)  (0.0289)  (0.0290) 
If head of household is literate  0.3162*  0.3288*  0.3633*  0.3612* 
  (0.0235)  (0.0252)  (0.0265)  (0.0265) 
Rural  -1.1122*  -0.8778*  -0.9031*  -0.9032* 
  (0.0273)  (0.0309)  (0.0327)  (0.0321) 
Income quintile 1  -0.3110*  -0.3197*  -0.3857*  -0.3781* 
  (0.0332)  (0.0369)  (0.0394)  (0.0394) 
Income quintile 2  -0.3536*  -0.3073*  -0.3306*  -0.3301* 
  (0.0327)  (0.0343)  (0.0363)  (0.0363) 
Income quintile 3  -0.2261*  -0.1985*  -0.2149*  -0.2119* 
  (0.0339)  (0.0352)  (0.0372)  (0.0371) 
Income quintile 4  -0.1304*  -0.1305*  -0.1475*  -0.1405* 
  (0.0334)  (0.0346)  (0.0365)  (0.0365) 
Community characteristics 
Access to roads  0.5738*  0.5198*  0.6446*  0.6356* 
  (0.0222)  (0.0234)  (0.0253)  (0.0250) 
District characteristics 
Distance to Accra     0.0033*  0.0041*  0.0043* 
     (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
Distance to regional capital     -0.0014*  -0.0015*  -0.0032* 
     (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
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Table 4. Continued 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Forest    0.5088*  0.5929*  0.7188* 
    (0.0312)  (0.0399)  (0.0396) 
Coastal    -0.1173*  -0.1225*  -0.0578 
    (0.0451)  (0.0491)  (0.0489) 
Ethnic fractionalization    -0.5795*  -0.8580*  -1.3133* 
    (0.0632)  (0.0766)  (0.0881) 
Population density (log)    0.4060*  0.4480*  0.3641* 
    (0.0202)  (0.0254)  (0.0273) 
Share of rural population     0.0008  0.0047*  0.0028* 
     (0.0009)  (0.0011)  (0.0012) 
Literacy level    0.0011  0.0016  0.0111* 
    (0.0014)  (0.0017)  (0.0018) 
Per capita total expenditures (log)     0.3686*  0.4098*  0.2964* 
     (0.0265)  (0.0319)  (0.0330) 
Access to information (radio)     0.0094*  0.0174*  0.0099* 
     (0.0008)  (0.0010)  (0.0012) 
Constant  1.6926  -5.2242  -6.8641  -5.0792 
  (0.0387)  (0.3193)  (0.3704)  (0.4034) 
Variances and covariances of random effects 
District      0.3057*  0.3475* 
      (0.0129)  (0.0168) 
Region        0.2597* 
        (0.0264) 
Pseudo R-squared  0.0907  0.1433  0.2118  0.2126 
Log likelihood  -26292.6  -24771.0  -22792.5  -22767.9 
Note: Models 1 and 2 are standard logistic regression models, and Models 3 and 4 are two- and three-level random-intercept 
models, respectively. The number of level-1 observations is 48,921, with 110 level-2 units (districts) and 10 level-3 units 
(regions). Logits of income quintiles are calculated with reference to quintile 5.    
*p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; ***p<0.1. 
5.3. Interactions 
In this section, we address two important questions. First, does the investment in human capital mitigate 
the negative impact of ethnic diversity on local public services? If so, then the negative impact of ethnic 
diversity on access to local public services should be lower in districts with higher literacy. Second, is the 
negative impact of ethnic diversity on local public services equal for urban and rural households? Table 5 
reports estimates of the interaction effects of ethnic diversity with literacy and rural households. The 
marginal effect of ethnic fractionalization, in these models, depends on the values of the literacy and rural 
variables, respectively, involved in the interactions. In particular, the marginal impact of a one-unit 
change in ethnic diversity on access to water depends on the level of average literacy in the district or 
whether a household is urban or rural. 
One of our key findings is that the negative impact of ethnic fractionalization diminishes as 
average literacy level increases. The marginal impact of ethnic fractionalization on drinking water and 
improved drinking water is equal to   
-0.5345*(EFI) + 0.0109*(EFI*Literacy level), and 
-1.4020*(EFI) + 0.0068*(EFI*Literacy level), 
respectively. The sizes and signs of the coefficients for the main and interaction terms illustrate how the 
relative impact of ethnic fractionalization varies by literacy level. 
The second important finding is that net impact of ethnic fractionalization is different for urban 
and rural households. In fact, for urban households (where rural dummy is zero), the marginal impact of  
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ethnic fractionalization is either virtually zero (improved drinking water) or positive (any source of 
drinking water). In contrast, for rural households (where rural dummy is 1), the marginal impact of ethnic 
fractionalization is significantly negative. The magnitudes of the coefficients for the main and interaction 
effects suggest that differences in the marginal impact of ethnic fractionalization between urban and rural 
areas are even greater in the case of improved drinking water. 
It is worth it to note that the introduction of interaction terms in model specifications did not 
result in significant changes in the estimated coefficients of other variables compared with our earlier 
estimations. This provides additional evidence of the robustness of the results.          
Table 5. Determinants of access to drinking water (household level, interactions) 
  
Drinking water  Improved drinking water 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Household characteristics 
If head of household is male  -0.1951*  -0.2008*  -0.3298*  -0.3154* 
  (0.0333)  (0.0333)  (0.0288)  (0.0288) 
If head of household is literate  0.2949*  0.3076*  0.3760*  0.3697* 
  (0.0305)  (0.0305)  (0.0264)  (0.0265) 
Rural  -0.6364*     -0.8897*    
  (0.0378)     (0.0318)    
Income quintile 1  -0.1222*  -0.1438*  -0.3807*  -0.3492* 
  (0.0444)  (0.0433)  (0.0389)  (0.0394) 
Income quintile 2  -0.1038**  -0.1074**  -0.3162*  -0.3004* 
  (0.0424)  (0.0419)  (0.0360)  (0.0363) 
Income quintile 3  -0.0639  -0.0629  -0.2042*  -0.1960* 
  (0.0436)  (0.0434)  (0.0370)  (0.0371) 
Income quintile 4  -0.0509  -0.0478  -0.1364*  -0.1319* 
  (0.0428)  (0.0427)  (0.0364)  (0.0365) 
Community characteristics 
Access to roads  0.3571*  0.3925*  0.6522*  0.6722* 
  (0.0284)  (0.0296)  (0.0253)  (0.0294) 
District characteristics 
Distance to Accra  0.0019*  0.0019*  0.0041*  0.0057* 
  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0001)  (0.0002) 
Distance to regional capital  0.0010  0.0026*  -0.0017*  -0.0019* 
  (0.0006)  (0.0004)  (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
Forest  0.7791*  0.9031*  0.5139*  0.4382* 
  (0.0824)  (0.0539)  (0.0320)  (0.0339) 
Coastal  0.5454*  0.6889*  -0.1275*  -0.1961* 
  (0.0616)  (0.0675)  (0.0502)  (0.0488) 
Ethnic fractionalization  -0.5345*  0.5101*  -1.4020*  -0.0224 
  (0.1374)  (0.1231)  (0.1555)  (0.0925) 
Ethnic fractionalization*literacy  0.0109*    0.0068*   
  (0.0031)    (0.0029)   
Ethnic fractionalization*rural    -1.1271*    -1.8350* 
    (0.0769)    (0.0653) 
Population density (log)  0.1475*  0.1805*  0.3882*  0.3427 
  (0.0278)  (0.0293)  (0.0249)  (0.0290) 
Share of rural population  -0.0035**  -0.0019  0.0052*  -0.0038* 
  (0.0016)  (0.0017)  (0.0010)  (0.0012)  
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Table 5. Continued. 
  
Drinking water  Improved drinking water 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Literacy level    0.0091*     0.0093* 
    (0.0020)     (0.0017) 
Per capita total expenditures (log)  -0.0720**  0.00346  0.2577*  0.6309* 
  (0.0341)  (0.0352)  (0.0299)  (0.0310) 
Access to information (radio)  0.0093*  0.0128  0.0194*  0.0035* 
  (0.0012)  (0.0011)  (0.0009)  (0.0010) 
Constant  0.7061  -1.6960  -5.1419  -8.3167* 
  (0.4070)  (0.4707)  (0.3530)  (0.3763) 
Variances and covariances of random effects       
District  0.2269*  0.2240*  0.3376*  0.2892* 
  (0.0146)  (0.0135)  (0.0128)  (0.0110) 
Region  0.0720*  0.0373*  0.3644*  0.1345* 
  (0.0219)  (0.0124)  (0.0386)  (0.0122) 
Pseudo R-squared  0.1468  0.1456  0.2123  0.2123 
Log likelihood  -19297.5  -19323.2  -22776.4  -22776.8 
Note: All models are three-level random-intercept logistic regressions. Logits of income quintiles are calculated with reference to 






In this paper we develop a simple framework that explains disparities in local public services between 
decentralized districts within a country. Our framework suggests that fundamental differences in 
geography and ethnic composition of population have important effects in local public service provision. 
We hypothesize that these effects are either direct or via other basic socioeconomic variables, such as 
income, population density, local institutions, and so forth.  
Then, we use this framework to examine observed differences in local public services between 
Ghana’s decentralized districts. We find that geography and ethnic diversity are important determinants of 
access to local public services. We also find that access to private and community-level public assets can 
diminish the effects of adverse geography. Our findings also suggest that district characteristics, such as 
literacy level, share of rural population, access to information, and district public expenditures, have a 
marginal effect on access to local public services. These results are robust to changes in model 
specification and across levels of analysis.  
In econometric as well as policy terms, the most interesting feature of the results is that no 
variable other than ethnic fractionalization is consistently, both in statistical and practical terms, 
significant across the levels and types of analysis. Relationships of ethnic fractionalization are robust and 
insensitive to changes in empirical specifications. Overall, the higher the ethnic fractionalization, the 
lower the level of access to local public services, including drinking water. The negative impact of ethnic 
fractionalization is especially severe in rural areas.  
Our results highlight difficulties in local public service provision in ethnically diverse 
jurisdictions and are consistent with evidence elsewhere (Alesina et al. 1999; Vigdor 2004; Miguel 2004; 
Miguel and Gugerty 2005) that examines the impact of ethnic diversity on local public services. The 
negative relationship between ethnic diversity and local public services can be explained by ethnic 
differences in tastes and preferences over the types of local public goods, weak social capital, and local 
institutions that manage interethnic relations. As Miguel and Gugerty (2005) underlines, probably a more 
promising approach for addressing adverse effects of ethnic diversity is advancing policies that promote 
successful cooperation across ethnic groups. The results of this paper point out the important role that 
education (literacy) may play in this regard. 
The data presented in this paper are from one of the most decentralized countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa and took some time to collect and organize. Its quality is sufficient to obtain relevant results. This 
process demonstrated that data, especially at the district level, regarding local economic development and 
public services are very scarce in Ghana. The government of Ghana and development partners should pay 
more attention to collecting and distributing appropriate data consistently and in a timely manner. 
Without such data, it will be very difficult to make coherent and efficient policies at the national as well 
as district level.      
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Table A.1. Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable  N  Min  Max  Mean  SD 
District level 
Access to services  110  1.2253  3.8053  2.2410  0.6226 
Distance from Accra  110  1.84  652.4  250.1  171.9 
Distance from regional capital  110  1.82  252.9  67.4  48.5 
Agro-ecological zone 
     Forest 
















Ethnic fractionalization  110  0.0666  0.8146  0.4199  0.2029 
Share of rural population  110  0  100  70.1  21.6 
Population density (log)  110  2.1  9.1  4.6  1.1 













Per capita total expenditures (log)  110  8.27  10.31  9.51  0.37 
Per capita capital expenditures (log)  110  7.55  10.16  9.10  0.43 
Internal revenue generation  110  4.4  67.6  18.9  11.3 
Access to information  
     Radio 

















Access to water  49,003  0  1  0.8264  0.3788 
Access to improved water   48,923  0  1  0.7220  0.4480 
Gender 
Household head’s literacy 
Rural household 
Income quintile 1 


























Income quintile 3  49,003  0  1  0.1700  0.3756 
Income quintile 4  49,003  0  1  0.1936  0.3951 
Income quintile 5  49,003  0  1  0.2937  0.4554 
Access to road  49,003  0  1  0.6408  0.4798 
 
Table A.2. Main characteristics of agro-ecological zones 








Major crops grown 
Forest  83,900  1,600  Bimodal  March–July  Tree crops (cocoa, citrus, oil-palm) 
Coastal  4,500  800  Bimodal  March–July  Cereals, starchy crops, and tree crops 
Other (savanna)  150,100  1,000  Unimodal  May–September   Cereals, legumes, vegetables 
 
Construction of the Access to Local Public Services Index 
The quantitative measurement of district-level access to local public services that we construct is a 
composite access to local public services index comprised of accessibility of households to service 
facilities. Data is obtained from the Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) survey on 
standardized welfare indicators. The survey comprised over 49,000 households representative at the 
district level, including 30,719 rural and 18,284 urban households. All 110 districts of Ghana that existed 
in 2003 were sampled.  
The survey asked households the following question: How long in minutes does it take from here 
to reach the nearest service facility? The five possible choices were as follows: 0–14 minutes, score 1;  
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15–29 minutes, score 2; 30–44 minutes, score 3; 45–59 minutes, score 4; 60 minutes or more, score 5. 
Thus, the higher the score, the longer the time to reach nearest service facility. The constructed index 
combines scores for the following basic social and infrastructure services: (1) supply of drinking water, 
(2) food market, (3) public transportation, (4) primary school, (5) secondary school, (6) health care 
facility (clinic or hospital), and (7) telecommunication facility.  
We used the Cronbach’s alpha to test the measurement properties and internal consistency of the 
seven individual items proposed for the access to services index. The literature on scale measurement 
suggests that a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.70 to 0.80 is acceptable, and anything above is considered very 
good (De Vellis, 1991). Table A.3 shows the item-test, item-rest, and average interitem correlations for 
each of the seven items and the alpha that would exist if each of the seven items was removed 
individually from the scale. The average interitem correlations are significant for all of the seven items. 
This specification results in an overall Cronbach’s alpha of 0.869, which appears acceptable using the 
criteria above. Table A.3 also shows that the removal of any of the items would not substantially improve 
the Cronbach’s alpha.  
We then conducted principal components analysis to determine whether the set of items assessed 
a single construct of access to local public services. The result is consistent with that of the Cronbach’s 
alpha. This analysis retained two factor loadings and showed that the set of items provide a one-
dimensional measure of access to local public services. These two factor loadings explain more than 70 
percent of total variances. 
Table A.3. Gronbach’s alpha for seven-item access to services standardized scales 













































Ghana’s current legal and organizational framework for the decentralization program is provided 
by the 1993 Local Government Act (Act 462), which replaced the Local Government Law of 1988 (Law 
207). The initiative for the program was motivated by a political philosophy of “power to the people” and 
the broader reform agenda whose principles concern the role and responsibilities of the various levels of 
government and private sector for economic development (Ayee 2003a, 2003b). The decentralization 
process in Ghana started with the establishment of 85 districts in 10 regions of the country in 1988. By 
1992, the number of districts had increased to 110.
11
The 1992 Constitution, which marked Ghana’s transition to a multiparty democracy, endorsed the 
1988 reforms by consolidating the principles of decentralization within the overall context of a liberal 
democratic constitution. This constitution laid out the principles of the autonomous role of local 
government and its downward accountability to the populace. A three-tier structure of subnational 
government was created at the regional, district, and subdistrict levels. This includes 10 regional 
coordinating councils; district assemblies (DAs); urban, zonal, town, and area councils; and unit 
committees. However, the DA is the key local government institution. Article 241 of the constitution 
states that they are “the highest political authority in the district … with deliberative, legislative and 
executive power.” DAs include both elected and appointed members. Seventy percent of DA members are 
   
                                                       
11 As a result of further changes in administrative structure of the country, the number of districts increased to 138 in 2004, 
and to 162 in 2007. However, this study is based on 110 districts due to lack of data for newly created districts.   
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elected in local government elections that are held every four years. The central government appoints the 
other 30 percent of DA members and the district chief executive (DCE), who is an ex-officio member of 
the respective DA. The members of the national parliament from a district are also entitled to participate 
in the DA with nonvoting capacity.  
In general, the DAs hold three to four general meetings each year, during which they act as the 
district legislature. The main administrative and executive functions of the DAs are undertaken by the 
respective executive committees, which are responsible for general policy and overall development 
planning in a given district. They are the principal authority in their respective districts for development 
activities, including coordinating and integrating other development partners. The districts are responsible 
for delivery of various public goods and services, including such significant areas as feeder roads, 
agricultural extension, primary and secondary education, health, water, and sanitation. Part of these public 
service delivery functions are devolved to district governments, while others are simply deconcentrated to 
them.  
Devolved public services entail full responsibility residing in the hands of district governments, 
including legislative (adopting bylaws), fiscal (revenue raising and expenditure allocation), and 
administrative discretionary power. Examples of such devolved services in Ghana include construction 
and maintenance of feeder roads, delivery of relief and sanitation services, and development planning. 
Delegated public services include those that are delegated to districts by the central government ministry 
or agency. In this case, the DAs act as agents of central government without significant discretionary 
power in these services. Examples of delegated services in Ghana are the provision of public health 
services in consultation with the Ministry of Health; the delivery of primary and secondary education 
under guidance of the Ministry of Education; and water supply in conjunction with the Ghana Water and 
Sewerage Corporation in urban areas and with the Community Water and Sanitation Agency in rural 
areas. 
With respect to fiscal decentralization, districts are entitled to generate their own internal 
revenues. However, the potential to generate their own internal revenue varies significantly across 
districts: Some districts cover up to 70 percent of their total public expenditures by internally generated 
revenues, yet some other, poor districts cover only about 5 percent of their total public expenditures by 
internally collected funds. The latter districts rely mostly on transfers from the national government. 
Article 252 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana mandated the transfer of at least 5 percent of total national 
fiscal revenues to district governments through the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF), which was 
implemented in 1994. Starting in 2008, the size of these transfers increased to 7.5 percent of the total 
national revenues. On average, in 2004, transfers from the central government accounted for over 80 
percent of total local revenues. The DACF grants are allocated between districts based on a special 
formula, which is approved by the national parliament every year. This formula considers various social 
and economic factors, such as need, responsiveness, service pressure, and equality, in allocation of DACF 
funds between districts (for a detailed discussion of the DACF and the allocation formula, see Banful 
2008).  
Earlier studies have shown that the development pattern in Ghana is characterized by a north-
south divide in which the south outperforms the north (ODI and CEPA 2005; Shepherd and Gyimah-
Boadi 2004). These studies claimed that underdevelopment of the north compared with the south is due to 
history, unfavorable climate and agro-ecological conditions, and postindependence political neglect. One 
previous study in particular found that overall inequality in Ghana has taken an upward trend since 1992 
and become increasingly polarized (Vanderpuye-Orgle 2002). This study argued that much of the 
variation in total inequality can be attributed to changes in spatial disparities between administrative 
regions, agro-ecological zones, and the rural-urban divide. However, there are serious gaps in the existing 
research. As we mentioned earlier, the main administrative unit for decentralization in Ghana is a district. 
Therefore, any meaningful decentralization policy needs information about levels and trends in 
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